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Penal populism, advocating severe punishment of criminals, has greatly influenced 
justice policy measures in eastern europe over the last decade. This article takes 
Hungary as a typical case in the region and based on a recent criminal policy reform it 
investigates the roots of the penal populist discourse, which legitimizes and supports 
punitive measures. The research assumes that policy discourses need specific social 
actors that construct and promote them. accordingly, the article explores whether the 
right-wing political parties and the tabloid media have taken a leading role in construct-
ing the discourse of penal populism as a response to public concerns about crime. 
Content analysis and frame analysis of political communication and media was con-
ducted to identify the discursive positions of major political parties and selected 
national media sources. The research found that penal populism was dominant in 
Hungarian political discourse while most of the media, including the tabloid press, 
have been rather reluctant to adopt punitive tones. The results thus contradict previous 
findings and offer a more nuanced view on how penal populism is being constructed 
and promoted in eastern europe.
Keywords:  crime; Eastern Europe; media framing; tabloidization; penal populism; 
policy making; political discourse
Introduction
Penal populism is “a punishment policy developed primarily for its anticipated 
popularity.”1 This key element of rising populism in eastern europe advocates 
harsher, tougher measures against perpetrators of crime. although compared to 
Western europe the level of punitivity of eastern european justice systems was 
already high in the 1990s,2 penal populism has recently captured penal policies in 
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the east and, as a consequence, even tougher punishments have been adopted or are 
being considered to be introduced into the penal laws.3 Studies on penal populism 
usually identify two main factors responsible for creating the discourse of penal 
populism: the populist radical right-wing parties and the tabloid media. In eastern 
europe, however, this phenomenon deserves closer attention. In spite of the numer-
ous studies devoted to this topic, we know relatively little about who exactly creates 
and promotes the penal populist discourse there.
Populism, which claims to represent and express the general will of common 
people and takes a strong anti-elitist stance, has recently been on the rise all over 
europe.4 The populist radical right, which promotes penal populism by urging tough 
measures against criminals, has found considerable electoral support in Western 
europe5 and, more recently, also in the new democracies of eastern europe.6 Yet, 
Minkenberg7 argues that at least in one important aspect eastern european right-
wing populism is different from its Western european counterpart. While in Western 
europe conservative parties have been able to tame and co-opt the electoral rise of 
the populist radical right, in eastern europe the radicalization of mainstream centre-
right parties has taken place. While in Western europe some “populist contagion” 
from radical to mainstream parties has certainly happened,8 it has remained limited 
in scope and mostly affected the rhetorical level only. In eastern europe the influ-
ence of populism is supposed to be more widespread and may affect even the policy 
outcomes. The causes of this phenomenon need further research; however, for the 
purposes of the present study it is important to note that when mapping the actors 
behind the penal populist discourse in eastern europe one should pay attention not 
only to radical but also to mainstream right-wing parties.
Other accounts consider the media as the main drivers of populism in general and 
penal populism in particular. For instance, Roberts et al.9 argue that by devoting spe-
cial attention to the coverage of violent crime, the media indirectly promote harsher 
sentences and penal populism. Furthermore, the way crime is framed in the media 
directly influences both politicians and the public on what (typically harsh) policy 
response would be appropriate for certain types of crime. In the eastern european 
context, mostly drawing on the example of Poland, Kossowska et al.10 find that the 
mass media are to a great extent responsible for generating punitive attitudes in the 
public, which also affects politicians’ stances on penal measures. especially the sen-
sationalist reporting style of the tabloid media—which emphasize brutal, violent 
incidents and suggest tough law enforcement measures—play a great role in promot-
ing penal populism.
We selected Hungary as the most typical, illustrative case for analyzing the dis-
course of penal populism in eastern europe. The country demonstrates all the features 
of the recently experienced populist backlash;11 thus, it is an emblematic case in the 
region.12 Moreover, recent studies have found that tabloid media have contributed to 
the rise of the radical right in Hungary13 and tabloid-style coverage of crime events has 
also been spreading there.14 Finally, in 2010 a justice policy reform adopted punitive 
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measures known as the “three strikes” principle.15 The country thus provides an opti-
mal case to test whether the discourse of penal populism in eastern europe is being 
promoted by radical and possibly also mainstream right-wing parties and/or the media.
The Discourse of Penal Populism—Analytical Framework and 
Hypotheses
Penal populism refers to a discourse which suggests that the justice system 
privileges criminals and prisoners at the expense of crime victims and the law-
abiding public.16 It appeals to emotions rather than reason as “penal populism usu-
ally feeds on expressions of anger, disenchantment and disillusionment with the 
criminal justice establishment.”17 The discourse reclaims the justice system for the 
“oppressed” or “silent” majority as it emphasizes the rights of common people to 
safety and security and demands that criminal justice be shifted away from protect-
ing criminals towards the interests of the law-abiding public. This explains most of 
the slogans associated with its initiatives: “three strikes,” “truth in sentencing,” “life 
means life,” “zero tolerance,” and so on.18 In sum, penal populism (1) relies on and 
generates fear of crime, suggesting that crime is a growing threat to society; (2) 
blames the justice system and its alleged impotence by criticizing the protection it 
provides to criminals; (3) and urges harsher punishments and tougher measures 
against perpetrators of crime.
The alternative or anti-populist approach to crime stresses that punitive penal 
policy is both ineffective and costly.19 It is ineffective because the severity of punish-
ment has negligible influence on criminal behaviour,20 and it is costly because it 
incurs growing expenses on the justice system, for instance, by increasing the num-
ber of prisoners.21 Besides the ineffectiveness problem, punitive measures are also 
argued to be unfair as they may obstruct fair trials and violate basic human rights.22 
The anti-populist view argues that crime prevention is best achieved by reducing 
social inequalities and improving upward social mobility.23 at the same time, it pro-
poses measures such as increasing the procedural fairness of the justice system, 
which would reinforce citizens’ normative compliance with it.24 In addition, it also 
urges innovative solutions of restorative justice in order to promote processes of 
repair, reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships instead of satisfying abstract 
legal principles and punishing the offenders.25
Where does the discourse of penal populism originate from? as mentioned above, 
because of its wide reach and persuasiveness, the media have great potential for 
shaping public opinion on crime, justice, and the police.26 Hohl stresses that by por-
traying a distorted picture of criminal activity, the media create widespread incredu-
lity about crime trends and are responsible for the declining levels of confidence in 
the justice systems.27 Falling trust is also linked to the “irrationally inflated” fear of 
crime which is believed to be fuelled by the media.28
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However, studies on policy discourses emphasize the role of crucial social actors 
that construct and spread them.29 Thus, without other relevant social actors, the 
media alone may not be sufficient to create and promote penal populism. Those 
actors can be experts, scientists, and other knowledge brokers as the concept of epis-
temic communities30 suggests; or NgOs and social movements that challenge and 
change the dominant interpretations on a specific social problem.31 In the case of 
penal populism, however, the typical actors that construct its discourse are predomi-
nantly populist movements and radical right-wing political parties.32 This is not to 
say that these actors and the media “cause” penal populism. Still, right-wing populist 
parties together with the media may construct the language of, and arguments for 
punitive justice policy, which may affect public opinion, too. Once the penal populist 
discourse becomes widespread, it may influence justice policy and could trigger the 
adoption of more punitive measures.33
accordingly, in this article we intend to map the discourse that created the prob-
lem stream behind the policy change that actually took place. We formulated the 
following research questions:
Research question 1: Is Hungarian political discourse on criminal justice issues divided 
primarily along the left–right axis? That is, does the liberal left oppose penal populist 
measures while right-wing parties support it?
Research question 2: are the media, particularly the tabloid media, promoting penal pop-
ulism by supporting the three-strikes initiative and framing crime in a populist manner?
In order to answer these questions about the Hungarian case, we performed con-
tent and frame analysis of both political and media discourses on crime and criminal 
policy. The content analysis aimed to identify discourses that can be labelled 
populist.
In order to better understand the discursive construction of crime and criminal 
policy, we also conducted a frame analysis in which we anticipated five dominant 
interpretive frames of crime and criminal justice that usually appear in political and 
media discourses.34 These frames provide an interpretive background on the origins 
of crime and based on their characteristics, some of them typically support the penal 
populist discourse while the others are rather used in anti-populist discourses of 
crime and penal policy.
The faulty system frame blames crime on the ineffective and weak criminal justice 
system, which does not sufficiently serve public security. The social breakdown frame 
views crime as a result of a general crisis in societal values that lead to the disintegra-
tion of families and small communities. This frame also involves the criminalization 
of antisocial behaviour such as begging, prostitution, and drug consumption and 
emphasizes the role of collective efforts against crime via crime watches and com-
munity policing. The violent media frame suggests that violence frequently portrayed 
in the mass media undermines respect for life. This frame implies that in order to 
decrease violence in real life, violence portrayed in the media should be reduced first.
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The blocked opportunities and racist system frames share a common crime-
conception suggesting that crime is the consequence of social inequality, discrimina-
tion, and social exclusion. The blocked opportunity frame finds the roots of criminal 
behaviour in rising unemployment, poverty, and low levels of education. The racist 
system frame refers to the racially/ethnically biased character of the criminal justice 
system. These frames interpret crime as a means through which the socially deprived 
express frustration as a result of their situation.
We did not expect all the frames derived from the literature to play a significant 
role in the Hungarian context.35 Moreover, in addition to the above frames pro-
posed by the literature,36 we included two other interpretive frames to fully cap-
ture the Hungarian context. In a recent study, Boda and Szabó37 found that a high 
proportion of media outlets in Hungary regarded crime as an inexplicable hybrid 
of coincidence and human brutality. although this frame seems to comply with 
the social breakdown frame, its main distinguishing feature is that it focuses 
almost exclusively on describing the brutality of criminal offences without offer-
ing any explanations of the origins of crime. We labelled it as the mean world 
frame because it gives an impression that life is full of violence and everybody 
(regardless of age, sex, and social status) can become a perpetrator or a victim of 
crime.38
another interpretive frame derives from the particular relation between the judi-
cial system and politics in Hungary. Fleck39 emphasizes that the autonomy of the 
Hungarian judicial profession is vulnerable as the political elite tends to interfere 
with it. This implies that we have to make a distinction between the perceived prob-
lems of the proper criminal justice system (revealed by the faulty system frame) and 
the perceived harmful influence of the political elite. For this reason, we apply a 
separate interpretive frame called the faulty politics frame, which refers to power-
abusing politics and corrupt politicians and suggests that criminal activity may be 
indirectly generated by the political elite.
The populist discourse, which usually argues that public security has to be 
enhanced by applying stricter measures of punishment and demands more state 
funding for the police and prisons, mainly builds on the faulty system, the social 
breakdown, and the mean world frames. In contrast, the anti-populist discourse, 
which argues that figures of crime rates do not substantiate the claims for harsher 
punishments and there is no evidence that harsher measures would reduce violent 
crime, mainly relies on the frames of blocked opportunities and a racist system. 
These two frames suggest that a punitive criminal code is rather counterproduc-
tive: to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour, the decision makers should improve 
the social conditions of marginalized people by enforcing equal opportunities and 
granting them greater access to education. However, the anti-populist discourse 
may also use the faulty system frame when criticizing the poor effectiveness of 
punitive policies and advocating new measures, like restorative justice or trust-
based policies.
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Penal Populism and Justice Policy Reform in Hungary: 
Background and Data
Our analysis focuses on the political and media discourses that accompanied the 
adoption of the three-strikes principle into Hungarian criminal law. Three-strikes 
laws originate from the United States where they significantly increased the prison 
sentences of perpetrators who had been previously convicted of two or more violent 
crimes or serious felonies. The debate about this issue in Hungary took place in two 
consecutive time periods, in the spring of 2009 and, after the parliamentary elec-
tions, in the spring and summer of 2010. In both periods, Fidesz, the moderate right-
wing conservative party proposed the introduction of the three-strikes principle into 
the criminal law. In February 2009, the party was in opposition and the socialist-
liberal majority voted down the initiative. However, in June 2010, after the general 
elections where the socialist government was ousted40 and Fidesz secured a consti-
tutional (two-thirds) majority in Parliament, the new Fidesz government passed a 
series of bills that introduced three-strikes statutes into Hungarian criminal law. as 
a consequence, the law now compels courts to impose life sentences on habitual 
offenders committing serious violent crimes.
In order to understand the general context, it is important to note that the years 
2008–2009 brought about the growing popularity of Jobbik, a radical right-wing 
party, which was first voted into parliament in the 2010 elections, and acquired about 
12 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The party played on public fear of crime, and 
in its main campaign message was urging tougher measures against the allegedly 
growing Roma (or gipsy) crime. Jobbik proposed to increase the severity of sentenc-
ing, demanded greater public spending on police, and encouraged grass-roots orga-
nizations of self-defence. The law-and-order discourse of the party was one of the 
main factors that brought its electoral success in the european Parliament elections 
in 2009 and in the 2010 general elections.41
Thus, a possible root of penal populism in Hungary is the radical right-wing 
because Jobbik was the first political party that placed the issue of justice and crime 
on the political agenda. However, once in power, the moderate right-wing Fidesz 
adopted many of the propositions of Jobbik, including the increase in the severity of 
punishment. This is consistent with the claims of Minkenberg,42 who observed the 
radicalization of mainstream right-wing parties in eastern europe.
The political parties may have had a political rationale for adopting the penal 
populist discourse because public attitudes in Hungary favour punitive measures. 
Data from the fourth round of the eSS survey (2008)43 reveal that the level of expres-
sive punitivity,44 which reflects a general desire for tougher penalties, is among the 
highest in europe. This suggests that penal populism falls on fertile ground there. 
Nevertheless, the general level of fear of crime45 is not particularly high in Hungary 
if we take a european perspective (Figure 1).
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However, people rarely have fixed and consistent attitudes about specific issues,47 
and attitudes alone do not make up a policy discourse. The attitudes of Hungarian 
people may be compatible with penal populism, but this does not exclude the possi-
bility that they could accept other discourses and frames on crime and justice as well. 
Indeed, a representative survey conducted in September 2009 revealed that popular 
interpretations about the roots of crime may be compatible with a more liberal and 
less punitive political discourse on justice policy (Table 1). The relative majority, 
nearly half of the respondents (47 per cent), believed that poverty and related social 
problems were the main causes of public security concerns. This complies with the 
crime conception of the blocked opportunities frame that finds the root of crime in 
social inequality and exclusion. Only 12 per cent of the respondents blamed the 
police for crime, which is the usual scapegoat of penal populism. This suggests that 
while Hungarians are strongly in favour of more punitive criminal justice measures, 
they do not necessarily share the populist interpretations about the origins of crime.
In order to chart how these public attitudes are channelled and formulated by 
major policy actors, we collected the relevant assertions of political actors and cor-
responding media content that dealt with the issue of the criminal law reform, one 
month before and two months after the respective parliamentary debates. Following 
our research questions we assumed that the penal populist discourse and the support 
for the three-strikes initiative would be dominant in right-wing political statements 
Figure 1
Expressive Punitivity and Fear of Crime across Europe in 200846
Source: authors’ own calculations, eSS data (2008)
Note: The indicators have been standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
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while they would remain sporadic in left-wing politics. We also assumed that the 
penal populist discourse would be heavily present in the tabloid media, while the 
quality press would rather be exempt from it.
We identified 69 items that constituted the main political discourse regarding the 
three-strikes principle. The sources of these records include documents of three par-
liamentary debates (2 March 2009, 21 May 2010, 5 July 2010) devoted to the three-
strikes laws and related penal measures (twenty-seven items), press releases, 
campaign materials, the government programme for 2010–2014, and related entries 
published on the parties’ official websites and social media profiles (forty-two items). 
We considered each piece of communication (e.g., a parliamentary speech or a press 
release) as a single item and sought to identify whether a given item is a manifesta-
tion of the penal populist discourse.48
as for the media analysis, we selected six media sources: the two most popular 
daily broadsheets (Magyar Nemzet, right-wing; and Népszabadság, left-wing), the 
two most popular daily tabloids (Blikk and Bors), and the two most frequently read 
online news portals (Index and Origo). empirical evidence on the Hungarian media 
landscape supports our choice. even though the readership of daily broadsheets has 
been shrinking over the last decade, quality papers still play an active role in framing 
policy changes.49 Tabloids pay special attention to crime and crime-related political 
issues,50 while the growing popularity of online portals justifies the inclusion of the 
internet-based media into the scope of inquiry.51 However, we did not include into 
our analysis commercial TV programmes because recent media studies did not find 
significant differences between daily tabloids and commercial channels in terms of 
their reporting styles of crime-related events.52
By using a set of keywords,53 we collected articles dealing with crime and criminal 
justice published in the above indicated periods. We also filtered the false positives, 
which for instance discussed crime fiction (books, TV series, films, etc.) or criminal 
activity abroad. as a next step, we selected those articles that were directly dedicated 
Table 1
Perceptions about the Main Factors Affecting Public Security  
in Hungary, 2009
Which of the following factors do you think has the most 
important effect on public security?
Share (%) of valid responses 
(N = 928)
The current state of the police 12.0%
Social tensions, impoverishment 47.2%
ethnic conflicts 16.3%
Organized crime 8.9%
The elite does not display a moral example to follow 9.9%
Other response 5.7%
Source: Századvég survey, September 2009.
 at Central European University on December 11, 2014eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Boda et al. / Politically Driven 9
to the issue of the three-strikes initiative. Surprisingly, slightly more than 1 per cent (53 
items) of the total 4779 articles fell into this category (three-strikes sample; referred to 
hereafter as TSS). The very low coverage suggested that neither the print nor the online 
media showed particular interest in the topic. In order to gain a general overview of 
how Hungarian media discuss crime, we also took a 5 per cent random sample of the 
remaining articles and we coded them as well (this constituted our general crime sam-
ple, referred to hereafter as gCS). When coding the articles, our aim was to find their 
main message, that is, whether they implied a rather populist or anti-populist under-
standing of the origin and nature of crime.54 again, each article counted as one item.
every political and media item was coded by two independent researchers. When 
the coding of an item differed, the research team discussed the issue and determined 
the final coding. We coded all the material according to three main aspects. First, the 
researchers identified basic information about the item’s author/publisher, genre, and 
date of publication. The second aspect consisted of an evaluation of whether the 
content of the item supported the three-strikes principle or in general promoted 
harsher penal measures. We also assessed whether the main message of the text was 
populist or not. For this, we used an operationalized definition of penal populism 
based on the scholarly approaches presented above. a discourse is labelled as penal 
populist if it (1) stresses the rights and interests of crime victims in particular and the 
law-abiding public in general as contrasted to those of criminals and prisoners; (2) 
uses expressions of anger, disenchantment, and disillusionment with the criminal 
justice establishment; (3) takes the form of “feelings and intuitions” or expressions 
of everyday talk between citizens rather than some more quantifiable indicators; (4) 
employs a tabloid style of communication that bears simplicity and directness. a 
discourse had to exhibit at least two of these features in order to be labelled as popu-
list. Finally, in the frame analysis, we coded the interpretive frame(s) that the text 
provided on crime and justice.55 Discourses that do not show the features of penal 
populism fall into two categories. We labelled anti-populist those communications 
that took a direct stance against the populist approach. as we will see, political dis-
courses were either populist or anti-populist. However, a number of media items 
could not be classified into any of these two categories. They are nonpopulist or 
descriptive, without expressing a clear position on the issue and simply reporting 
news, like the adoption of the new criminal bill or a robbery. In the following sec-
tions, we summarize the results of our empirical analysis. First, we analyse the politi-
cal discourse and we continue with the evaluation of the media discourse.
The Political Discourse Revolving around the three-strikes 
Initiative
Fidesz was the dominant actor both in the first and the second phase of the debate 
on the three-strikes initiative as the party issued more than half (thirty-eight items) 
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of all the political communication records in this topic. Thus, the conservative party 
was the clear issue owner shaping the political agenda concerning the three-strikes 
laws. after their draft bill had been rejected by the socialist-liberal majority in 
March 2009, Fidesz launched a signature campaign56 to demonstrate that there was 
significant public demand for a more punitive penal policy.57 The penal policy 
reform became a salient issue after Fidesz won the elections in 2010 as it also con-
stituted a key part of the new government’s programme.58 Fidesz MPs emphasized 
that the former socialist-liberal government applied lenient policies that neither 
deterred perpetrators nor protected the law-abiding public. The party’s programme 
declared,
The laws of the previous government led by Ferenc gyurcsány encouraged offenders 
to commit crimes rather than protect the victims and law-abiding people. . . . This must 
be changed.59
Fidesz also argued that because of the ineffective penal policy, violent crimes reached 
record high levels and as a consequence the general public had lost its trust in the 
criminal justice system.60 However, criminal justice statistics do not fully support 
these claims. Between 1999 and 2009, the annual number of cases of registered 
crime in Hungary fell from 505,000 to slightly below 394,000. at the same time, 
crimes against persons increased from 19,000 to 24,000 per year in the same period.61 
The arguments of Fidesz about the origins of crime comply mostly with the faulty 
system frame. Other frames rarely appeared in their communication although we 
identified traces of the social breakdown frame and the mean world frame in 4 of the 
recorded items. Yet, they were always accompanied by the dominant faulty system 
narrative.62
Jobbik (the radical right-wing party) was also keen to express its standpoints on 
the three-strikes laws (thirteen recorded items). The party clearly communicated its 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the criminal justice system over the last two 
decades and blamed the “leftist-liberal intellectuals” for protecting the perpetrators 
rather than the victims. Jobbik demonstrated deep scepticism about the reliability of 
crime statistics.63 The position of the party complied with the faulty system frame as 
most of the party’s recorded items referred to the inability of the criminal justice 
system to prevent violence. In some instances, social breakdown was also referred to 
as a cause of rising crime rates. even though Jobbik was clearly advocating a much 
stricter criminal law, the party opposed the initiative of Fidesz about the three-strikes 
bills. Jobbik believed that the proposed modifications were insufficient as they did 
not introduce fundamental, more punitive changes into the penal code. Jobbik’s 
stance can thus be summarized as “yes to the principle, no to the bills.”64
Unexpectedly, in the first phase of the debate, the socialist government officials 
did not provide a strong alternative position to the three-strikes initiative, and neither 
did the socialist MPs in the second phase, after Fidesz had won the elections. In 
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2009, the socialist government questioned the criminological adequacy of the three-
strikes model and raised constitutional doubts about introducing it into the penal 
code. However, the socialists acknowledged that the level of violent crime was 
increasing and admitted the need for urgent policy interventions.65 after the elec-
tions, the party offered surprisingly few contributions to the second phase of the 
debate. Only two socialist MPs raised their voices in Parliament. One of them sharply 
criticized the three-strikes principle and also highlighted that Fidesz drafted the bills 
without consulting legal experts.66 However, another socialist MP expressed his 
commitment towards a more punitive penal code and he stressed that the former 
socialist government also issued stricter measures to fight against violence. at the 
same time, he doubted whether the three-strikes principle would be appropriate to be 
introduced in Hungary.67
Concerning the anti-populist discourse, only the green-liberal party (LMP) repre-
sented a consistent approach against penal populism. They grounded their arguments 
in academic research that compared penal policy practices in the world and con-
cluded that the three-strikes principle had no positive effect on public security: “No 
evidence has been found to prove the efficacy of the ‘three strikes’ model.”68 In the 
debate only the LMP contextualised crime as a social phenomenon pointing to the 
high correlation between poverty, social exclusion, and crime. The following quote 
from the party’s election programme demonstrates this aspect:
Poverty and low levels of education always involve a greater chance of violating social 
norms. . . . This is a complex problem which cannot be solved by using merely punitive 
crime control techniques. . . . What we promote is a structurally renewed, non-discrim-
inative set of policies granting equal opportunity to deprived communities to integrate 
them into society.69
They also argued that without overcoming social obstacles (lack of equal opportuni-
ties and discrepancies in the social and education services) in deprived areas, harsher, 
more punitive crime policy measures would not reduce crime. While LMP also heav-
ily criticized the punitive penal policies of the previous socialist-liberal governments, 
it denounced the positions of both Fidesz and Jobbik and accused them of deepening 
social conflicts by maintaining the exclusion of the marginalized groups:
Notwithstanding our deepest sympathy for the victims of crime, an increase in the 
imprisoned population would not solve the problem of crime. It would create more 
trouble which will jeopardize the fragile social peace.70
Instead of introducing harsher measures, the party advocated elements of restorative 
justice (victim-offender mediation) to tackle crime.71 LMP’s communication can 
thus be characterized as a combination of the blocked opportunities and faulty sys-
tem frames.
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These findings suggest that most of the Hungarian political actors internalized 
public anxiety about crime. except for the green-liberal LMP, the parties argued for 
more punitive penal measures although only Fidesz supported the punitive changes 
to the Penal Code. This dominance of the penal populist discourse may explain why 
so few alternatives to the three-strikes bills appeared during the debates. almost the 
entire political spectrum (Fidesz, Jobbik, and MSZP) shared the discourse of penal 
populism, which was based on the presumption that the criminal justice system was 
inefficient in tackling crime. Only the green-liberal party attempted to counterbal-
ance the dominant “law-and-order” language (Table 2). Interestingly, the communi-
cations of the political actors were mostly based on the faulty system frame. It seems 
that blaming the system is a common argumentative approach for the Hungarian 
political elite in discussing penal policy. This frame can support both populist and 
anti-populist discourses, as criticism of the current justice system relying on this 
frame can be formulated from both perspectives.
The Media Discourse
Our second research question concerned the role of the media and especially the 
tabloids in creating an atmosphere conducive to penal populism. The possible role 
of the media can be substantiated in a stronger and a weaker version. The stronger 
version understands tabloid media as the major, direct contributor to the penal popu-
list discourse while the weaker version assumes that media, especially tabloids, are 
indirectly shaping Hungarian citizens’ and politicians’ perceptions of criminality 
through frequent, expressive, and often brutal presentation of crime. Recent research 
on eastern europe has found evidence supporting the weaker version of understand-
ing the role of the media72 but the emerging trend of media popularization and 
Table 2
Map of the Political Discourse Concerning the Three-Strikes Initiative
Penal Populist Discourse anti-populist Discourse
Political actors Jobbik (radical right-wing party) LMP (green-liberal party)
 Fidesz (centre-right party) and cen-
tre-right government officials
 
 MSZP (socialist party) and socialist government officials 
Frames Faulty system Social breakdown Blocked opportunities
 Mean world Faulty system
Suggested policy measures More punitive measures Protecting vulnerable groups
 Three-strikes principle Restorative justice
Number of items n = 59 n = 10
 at Central European University on December 11, 2014eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Boda et al. / Politically Driven 13
tabloidization73 makes the stronger version also relevant. accordingly, the three-
strikes sample (TSS) may serve to answer whether the media contribute directly to 
the penal populist discourse, while the analysis of the general crime sample (gCS) 
may explore the dominant interpretation (frame) on crime and justice that the media 
are offering.
The number of media articles specifically dedicated to the three-strikes initiative 
was fairly low (n = 53) in the analysed sources, which indicated limited media inter-
est in the issue. Surprisingly, only a quarter (13 items) of the three-strikes articles 
took an unambiguously populist stance towards the initiative either by agreeing with 
it or by suggesting the need for tougher penal measures to prevent crime. The right-
wing broadsheet, Magyar Nemzet was responsible for nearly half (6 items) of these 
populist items and it was the only media source in the TSS sample where the populist 
articles outnumbered the clearly anti-populist ones. It seems that the right-wing 
broadsheet had accommodated and was spreading the Fidesz’s position.
as the following quote demonstrates, in some cases Magyar Nemzet applied typi-
cal penal populist rhetoric:
Public security is deteriorating in Hungary. . . . In fact, it is not deteriorating, it has 
ceased to exist. . . . The opposition party74 proposed to introduce stricter measures into 
the criminal justice system. . . . More of these initiatives are necessary and not only 
here but all over the continent. . . . The justice system should deliver justice but this is 
only possible if it serves the law-abiding citizens instead of the criminals.75
The online portals and especially the left-wing broadsheet expressed a rather anti-
populist attitude towards the three-strikes initiative. Considering these three media 
outlets together, only five items were coded as explicitly populist. The two tabloid 
newspapers showed the least interest in the three-strikes debate: they published only 
seven articles on this topic, out of which three items expressed support for the initia-
tive. That is, the tabloids were rather reluctant to formulate a clear position in the 
debate.
Concerning the discursive frames, the most common one in the TSS was the 
faulty system frame, which was almost equally distributed among the left-wing and 
the right-wing newspapers, tabloids, and online media sources. The mean world 
frame was notably present in the right-wing broadsheet and the tabloids, while it 
was completely missing from the left-wing newspaper. although both the faulty 
system and the mean world frames may provide penal populist arguments, we found 
that the faulty system frame was also used in anti-populist assertions indicating that 
a general discontent with the Hungarian criminal justice system does not necessarily 
involve a populist stance. The apparent agreement about the serious functional 
problems of the system sometimes implies disagreement with populist measures of 
punitive rigour as was also observed in our analysis of the political discourse on 
penal populism:
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The increase in the number of minor thefts below the felony threshold has become a 
factor basically undermining the security perception of the inhabitants in several 
regions. . . . Nobody debates the objectives of the new policies, but we criticize the 
suggested measures as in general the prospect of stricter punishment has no impact on 
potential criminals. especially in the case of youth, confinement does not bring about 
respect for social norms; in addition, it breaches international norms.76
In our general crime sample, which consisted of 233 articles, the share of explicitly 
populist items was even smaller than in the case of the TSS: only 6 per cent of the 
gCS was coded as unambiguously populist. Magyar Nemzet, the right-wing broad-
sheet, was responsible for half of those populist articles while the explicit presence 
of penal populism in the other media sources was negligible. However, this does not 
imply that the majority of the Hungarian media sources would be definitely anti-
populist either. Indeed, most of the items in the gCS provide only mere descriptions 
of crimes—this is what we simply call non-populist. This media sample, especially 
the tabloid and the online sources, are dominated by news stories and articles without 
offering any interpretation about crime and justice.77 a typical example of such a 
descriptive, non-populist item was published in a Hungarian tabloid:
It is not enough that the flood devastated his home; then the man was attacked by a 
robber at his temporary lodgement. He began to grapple with the criminal who beat him 
and the victim suffered an injury that would heal in more than eight days. The police 
started an investigation.78
With respect to the occurrence of crime frames in the gCS, the mean world frame 
appeared most frequently as we identified this frame in the majority of the descrip-
tive articles (illustrated by the example above). The second most often used frame 
was the faulty system (19 per cent) followed by the faulty politics frame (6 per cent). 
The fact that blocked opportunities, violent media, and racist system frames were 
almost completely missing reflects that the Hungarian media sources offer a highly 
limited explanation about the causes of crime (Table 3).
The dominant descriptive approach of criminality that ignores the possible social 
and policy arguments usually presents individual stories and it simply illustrates the 
cruelty of human life. If any social explanation of crime is given at all, then it is usu-
ally portrayed according to the faulty system, or the faulty politics frame. This sub-
stantially confines the media discourse on the origins of crime to a few possible 
interpretations: crime is either described as a natural attribute of life that is full of 
violence or it is blamed on the weak criminal justice system or on the corrupt politi-
cal elite. as the last two interpretations typically belong to the penal populist dis-
course, it is no surprise that in the three-strikes debate they appeared most frequently 
even though sometimes they were also employed in an anti-populist context express-
ing a general dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hungarian political elite and 
the criminal justice system.
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Based on these results, we did not find evidence in support of the tabloids driving 
the discourse of penal populism. In Hungary, it is not the tabloid press but the right-
wing daily that took a leading role in this process. However, while explicit penal 
populism seems to be limited to the right-wing broadsheet, very few articles pre-
sented counter-arguments to the penal populist discourse in the press. That is, while 
the Hungarian press in general does not seem to use the discourse of penal populism, 
it is far from expressing an anti-populist tone either.
We cannot reject, however, that through the expressive portrayal of violent crime, 
the media indirectly shape popular attitudes towards the criminal justice system. 
although most of the analyzed articles gave a fairly neutral account of crime events, 
we found that the two tabloids as well as the two online portals did not refrain from 
emphasizing the gory, brutal details of violent acts. given the already high level of 
punitivity in Hungary, the public may be sensitive to such reports of crime, which 
may further raise punitive attitudes. Yet, the evidence that we collected is not suffi-
cient for drawing a definite conclusion in this respect.
Conclusion
Considering Hungary as a typical case of rising populism in eastern europe, we 
attempted to explore the political and the media discourse about the introduction of the 
three-strikes principle into the Hungarian penal code. We expected to find a clear 
divide between the discourses of the supposedly populist right-wing and the anti-
populist liberal left-wing parties. We also assumed that the media, especially the tab-
loids, would foster rather populist ideas about crime and punishment. However, our 
analysis did not fully support these hypotheses. In fact, the results are quite surprising 
in that they show a remarkable mismatch between the political and media discourses.
Table 3
Map of the Hungarian Media Discourse of Penal Populism and Crime
Media Sources
Left-Wing 
Broadsheet 
(Népszabadság)
Right-Wing 
Broadsheet 
(Magyar Nemzet)
Online Media 
(Index and 
Origo)
Tabloids (Blikk 
and Bors)
Dominant discursive  
positions
anti-populist Populist and 
descriptive
Descriptive and 
anti-populist
Descriptive
Frames Faulty system Faulty system Faulty system Mean world
 Faulty politics Social breakdown Faulty politics Faulty system
 Mean world Mean world  
Number of items, three-
strikes sample (TSS)
n = 15 n = 10 n = 21 n = 7
Number of items, general 
crime sample (gCS)
n = 33 n = 52 n = 98 n = 50
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Based on the content and frame analysis, we found that the Hungarian political 
parties are almost entirely inclined to penal populism and only LMP, the green-lib-
eral party, poses an exception to this rule. Penal populism is not restricted to the radi-
cal right but it has been incorporated and, through the promotion of the three-strikes 
principle, actively spread by Fidesz, the centre-right conservative party. The social-
ists have also expressed markedly punitive attitudes and in this sense penal populism 
has become the mainstream political discourse in Hungary. as the level of punitivity 
of the Hungarian population is high (especially in a european comparison), playing 
on these attitudes may bring electoral success: the steeply rising popularity of the 
radical right-wing Jobbik has illustrated this point. However, when it comes to the 
interpretation of the causes and origins of crime, the majority of Hungarians do not 
express populist beliefs as they tend to share the view that criminal activity is mainly 
caused by blocked social opportunities and impoverishment. Yet, neither the political 
nor the media discourses reflect these more nuanced attitudes. While the Hungarian 
population expresses a mixture of both punitive and liberal positions, political dis-
course remains almost entirely punitive. This may suggest that political parties do 
not only exploit public punitivity but also play a leading role in shaping and reinforc-
ing those attitudes through the construction and promotion of the penal populist 
discourse.
Regarding the role of the media, we did not find sufficient evidence for the case 
that tabloids would be the main drivers of penal populism in Hungary. The media 
seem to be more balanced and also rather more neutral in discussing crime than the 
political parties. The only exception in this respect is the right-wing broadsheet, 
which has consistently supported the three-strikes initiative. In spite of this, punitiv-
ity does not characterize the media discourse as much as it is a typical feature of the 
political discourse.
although the media were reserved concerning the penal populist discourse, we 
have to emphasize that the anti-populist interpretations of crime were almost 
entirely missing from the analyzed media sources. Interpretive frames of crime 
that may appeal to punitive attitudes frequently appear in the media in a descrip-
tive, non-argumentative way. So the apparent neutrality does not rule out that 
Hungarian media actually serve punitive public sentiments and indirectly rein-
force them especially through the general trend of tabloidization in the media 
coverage of crime.
Our findings suggest that there is a more complex interplay between public atti-
tudes to crime and the media and political discourses than is usually assumed in the 
literature. While the media are often found to be the main drivers of penal populism, 
the Hungarian case shows that a strongly and almost uniformly punitive political 
discourse may also become the key element in reinforcing punitive attitudes of the 
public. Our analysis demonstrated that this may happen even if the media remain 
rather reluctant towards the punitive political discourse.
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The general take of the literature is that right-wing populist parties and the tabloid 
media are the main drivers of the penal populist discourse. This claim is mostly based 
on empirical research conducted either in Western european or North american con-
texts. although recent empirical works on eastern europe also seem to reinforce this 
point, our findings suggest that there is a more nuanced, much less straightforward 
relationship between the recent rise of penal populism in eastern europe and the role 
played in this process by the media and political parties. Our research highlights the 
primacy of politics; even if explicit populist discourses are modestly represented in 
the media, penal populism may capture the discourse of nearly the whole political 
spectrum, which evidently leads to the adoption of harsher penal measures. This 
brings further evidence for the claim that in eastern europe the radicalization of 
mainstream political parties is taking place.
Why policy makers chose the populist stance is a question that remains open. Was 
it out of strategic considerations (competition with the far right), ideological commit-
ment, or a mix of different reasons? These questions point toward explaining causes 
of penal policy change that was not the objective of our endeavour here, though we 
believe that our findings also open up new research streams from that perspective.
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